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 When two parties agree to preserve trees on a piece of property, they 
may intend this agreement to last beyond the involvement of the original 
contracting parties.1 If one of either contracting parties should sell his land, the 
other party can rely on the continued duration of the agreement for the 
preservation of the trees. The same logic applies to covenants that grant owners 
of land within a village the right to use the roads, maintained by the owner, 
subject to a maintenance charge payable to the owner.2 Similarly, imagine a 
community that imposes a covenant scheme that restricts land use to single-family 
residential uses, prohibiting all commercial uses.3 
                                                                 
1 See for example, City of New York v. Delafield  246 Corp., 662 N.Y.S. 2d. 286, 294 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997), where a a current owner of a tract of land, originally bequeathed to 
Columbia University, refused to preserve existing trees on the property and restore any 
trees damaged during construction of a 38 unit residential development. The court held that 
the covenant ran to the successor: “the greater the degree the covenant obligations unique 
to the covenanters, which can not exist independently from them, the less likely the 
covenant...touches and concerns the land. Conversely, the greater the effect of the 
covenant on the land itself, without regard for who owns it, the more likely it will be binding 
on successor owners.” (City of New York v. Delafield  City of New York v. Delafield 246 
Corp., 662 N.Y.S. 2d. 286, 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
2 Covenants granted a private right to the owner of each lot within a village to use the roads 
shown on the plat of the Village. These covenants provided that “said roads ... shall be ... 
maintained by the Owner, subject to a reasonable maintenance charge that may be made by 
the Owner, its successors or assigns, as condition to the exercise of such privilege of 
use....”  Its purpose is to separate those covenants that are personal and unrelated to the 
covenantor's ownership of land, from those that are "connected with" the land. [footnote 
omitted]. The court held that to touch and concern the land, a covenant must be related to 
the land so as " to enhance [the land's] value and confer a benefit upon it.", referring to 
Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash.2d 565, 575, 295 P.2d 714 (1956): 
maintenance commission for the costs of improving a street. In purpose and effect it 
substantially altered the rights connected with the land conveyed." (Rodruck , 48 
Wash.2d at 568-69, 295 P.2d 714.) 
3 Today, the most prevalent types of real covenants are those employed in common interest 
communities. Communities often impose covenant schemes that restrict land use to single-
family residential uses, prohibiting all commercial uses.  For instance, in Bluffs Div. II Park 
Protection Ass'n v. Radich , 91 Wash.App. 1036, 1998  WL 341963 (Wash.App. Div. 2, Jun 
26, 1998) (NO. 21693-1-II) NO CITING) the court restricts 10 lots in a subdivision to a park, 
where the covenants’ relation to the aesthetic value of the entire subdivision is decided by 
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 Although it is commonly understood that land use arrangements demand 
a certain degree of permanence to encourage optimal investment in the long term, 
the law of property is extremely selective in granting property right effect to these 
agreements between parties. That is to say, the law conservatively grants 
property-type remedies for the enforcement of these types of agreements. Of the 
land use arrangements listed above, under current law, only the latter agreement 
will unambiguously run with the land to bind successive owners.4 The question as 
to why certain private arrangements are denied the parties’ intended property 
right effect is puzzling. Indeed, the law’s distinction between promises that attach 
to the land and land-related agreements that are considered personal has 
produced considerable scholarship. The discussion continues today. Most 
recently, the latest Restatement of Property Law has reinforced a far stretching 
judicial discretion of land use arrangements.5 
                                                                                                                                                             
reference to  Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tydings, 72 Wash.App. 139, 145, 
864 P.2d 392 (1993) (citations omitted).  Also, a  court considered touch and concern 
fulfilled when "by restricting the use of one parcel, it enhances the value of another,” City 
of Olympia v. Palzer, 107 Wash. 2d 225, 728 P.2d 135 (1986) (holding that a greenbelt area 
within a park was an integral part of a subdivision, which benefited all of the homeowners); 
see also Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash.2d 565, 575, 295 P.2d 714 
(1956),  where the court wrote that “whether the covenant in question is so related to the 
land as to enhance its value and confer a benefit upon it.” 
4 Although one speaks in terms of covenants that run with the land, in fact, covenants run 
with an estate in land. This is of crucial importance where the exact estate is not conveyed 
to the new possessor, for instance when a part of the land is devised by the owner to 
several people and none of these receive the entire estate (fee simple). 
5 The Restatement has removed the age old requirement of touch and concern. It has 
introduced a new, broader test for the running of covenants. The restatement did, however, 
implement a more open standard for judicial invalidation. Judicial intervention is now 
restricted to violation of “public policy,” unconscionability, unreasonable restraints on 
trade, or changed circumstances This is situated within the Restatement’s focus away from 
the technical categorization towards ascertainment and effectuation of  private intentions. 
Moreover, the Restatement reflects the change in modern social reality. See further at note 
24. Although historically the “dominant servitude paradigm has been a private two-party 
use sharing regime” (Dan A. Tarlock, Touch and Concern is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 
77 NEBRASKA L. REV. 804, 812 (1998) [hereinafter Tarlock]), today’s predominant use of 
servitudes is found in the institutional design of common interest communities. On the role 
of residential associations, see Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants and Communities, 61 






As we will argue in this Article, recent developments in economic theory 
provide a new rationale for the dichotomous approach of land use arrangements 
in the law of servitudes that is almost universal in the modern Western legal 
tradition. The treatment of certain land-related promises as enforceable contracts 
between parties, rather than real rights that run with the land in perpetuity, can be 
explained as an attempt to minimize the transaction and strategic costs resulting 
from dysfunctional property arrangements. As demonstrated below, benchmark 
doctrines such as ‘touch and concern,’ and the civil law principles of ‘prediality’ 
and numerus clausus, have served as instruments to limit excessive or 
dysfunctional fragmentation of property rights. 
 
 Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the common law requirement of 
“touch and concern” and other similar restrictions in the civilian law of servitudes 
reveals a gradual shift in the law of property from an ex ante approach of 
preventing the creation of atypical property arrangements, exemplified by the 
enumerated rights approach of the early Civilian tradition, to an ex post 
approach of remedial protection from such arrangements, as found in the recent 
emergence of a “changed circumstances” doctrine in common law and civilian 
systems. 
 
Section I of this Article describes the dichotomous approach of land use 
arrangements in the law of servitudes in Common Law and Civil Law systems. 
Section II provides a functional explanation of the legal rules in this area. Section 
III documents and explains the changing approach to land use law in both 
Common Law and Civil Law jurisdictions. Section IV discusses the role of 
property law in a changing economy. Section V reflects on the appropriate 




                                                                                                                                                             
U. CHI. L. REV. 1375 (1994). 
3Depoorter and Parisi: Fragmentation of Property Rights





I. THE COMPLEXITY OF SERVITUDE LAW 
 
 The freedom of private parties to conceive land use arrangements is 
severely curtailed by an impressive body of formalistic and substantive 
requirements. These restrictions on the free creation of land use arrangements 
add considerably to the tremendous complexity of the law of servitudes.6 One 
esteemed scholar describes the American law of servitudes as “a murky subject 
burdened with obsolete forms and rules that have caused confusion and 
uncertainty.” According to another scholar “[t]he law in this area is an 
unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who ventures in this formidable 
wilderness never emerges unscarred”.7 Without venturing too deep into the 
“wilderness” of servitude law, this Section will illustrate the dichotomous 





A. Restrictions under Common Law  
 
 Historically, the common law doctrine of promissory servitudes running 
with the land was shaped in response to developing needs of residential 
landowners for innovative private land use arrangements.8 Chancery courts were 
increasingly faced with the limitations of the old institutions of contract law9 as 
                                                                 
6See e.g. French, infra note 16, 928-929 (listing as contributing factors to today’s 
complexity in servitude law: the courts’ fear for unchecked enforcement of servitudes and 
the typical common law fashion by which this judicial control has developed over many 
centuries). 
7 French, infra note 16, citing E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 
489 (1974). 
8 The doctrine can be traced back to the law of warranties in Henry VIII’s Statute of 1540 
that redistributed the Catholic Church’s land holdings in England. See Holdsworth’s 
history of english law, Volume 7 (The Common Law and its Rivals), 288-290; A.W.B. 
SIMPSON, A.W.B., A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW,  255-265 (2d. ed., 1986); SIR MATTHEW 
HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL LAW PART OF THE LAW 66 
(6th ed. 1820). 
9 Under traditional common law, the rights and duties associated with contracts were not 





they invalidated the small number of recognized negative easements10 from 
Roman law which no longer met the increasing demands of allowing land use 
among persons other than the original contracting parties.11 Due to the perceived 
net benefits of having the rights and burdens of a land use-related promise attach 
to the title of property  (i.e. “run” with the land), courts gradually created a new 
body of law to overcome the obstacles posed by traditional property and 
contract theories. As such, real covenants which ran with the land developed as 
a special class of promises enforceable in law, as an exception to the principle 
that promises are personal to the makers.  In addition, on the basis of “equitable 
consent,” such as formulated in Tulk v.Moxhay,12 equity would enforce 
agreements preventing the use land in a particular manner against subsequent 
purchasers.13 At the same time, courts have traditionally limited the number and 
variety of new types of servitudes. In this process, the freedom of private parties 
to conceive binding land use arrangements was severely curtailed by a manifold 
of legal requirements.  
 
 Courts require of both real covenants and equitable servitudes that the 
original grantee and grantor have intended that the covenant run with the land 
(there must be clear intention of the original parties).  With regard to real 
covenants, there must be “privity of estate” (a grantor-grantee relationship) 
                                                                                                                                                             
assignable (Arthur L. Corbin, Assignment of Contract Rights, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 207 (1926)) 
because parties to the original agreement did not have the right to bind third parties to 
adhere to their arrangement. Accordingly, the benefits and burdens of the original 
covenants did not transfer with the interest in the land. In many situations, this frustrated 
the purpose of creating a real covenant in the first place. 
10 On a base level, negative covenants such as building restrictions could be enforced as 
negative easements of light and air. See Comment,“Equitable Restrictions” in Louisiana, 
33 TUL. L. REV. 827 (1959).  
11 On the foundation of land uses, the role of the Court of Chancery and the impact of land 
uses on the feudal system, see JENKS, EDWARD, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 96-
101(4th ed. 1928).  
12 See CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND (2d ed. 1847) [hereinafter 
CLARK I], citing Tulk v. Moxhay, Phil. 774, 41 Eng Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848); 5 RICHARD R.,  
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 161 (1962) [hereinafter POWELL]; CLARK, COVENANTS RUNNING 
WITH THE LAND 3-4 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter CLARK II]. 
13 Comment, “Equitable Restrictions” in Louisiana, 33 TUL. L. REV. 827 (1959). 
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between the party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it 
and the party upon whom the burden of the covenant is to be imposed.14 Of both 
real covenants and equitable servitudes courts require that the covenant must 
‘touch and concern’ the land. Each of the above requirements needs to be met 
simultaneously for a covenant to bind subsequent owners.15 These requirements 
on the running of promises and burdens of land use arrangements account for 
much of the tremendous complexity of the law of servitudes as we find it today.16 
According to some, these restrictions personify rigid formality and are a serious 
devaluation of freedom of contract.17 Many scholars have questioned the viability 
                                                                 
14 The requirement that the original parties to the covenant need to be in privity of estate 
was laid down in Spencer’s Case (5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583)). Privity of 
estate was not defined in the case and its meaning was to be assessed by subsequent 
court rulings.  Different views came to the surface: In England, it was understood that the 
original parties were in a landlord-tenant relationship (Keppell v. Bailey, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 
(1834)).  Yet some American states established that there was to be an interest in the 
property other than the covenant held by both parties (Morse v. Aldrich, 36 Mass. 449 
(1837)).  Still others determined that the covenant was contained in a conveyance of an 
interest in land - e.g. a fee simple (Wheeler v. Shad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871)) or the reality of a 
mutual or successive relationship (RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, section 534). American 
courts adopted Spencer’s Case but liberalized it by relaxing the horizontal privity 
requirement and lifting the prima facie prohibition on affirmative, as opposed to negative, 
covenants (with the exception of New York).  
15 For a description of each of these terms, see ELLICKSON, ROBERT C., AND TARLOCK, A. 
DAN, LAND-USE CONTROLS : CASES AND MATERIALS, 620P. (1981); FRIEDMAN, MILTON R. 
(1998), CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1998). 
16 French, Susan F., Towards a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient 
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1265 (1982) [hereinafter French], lists as factors for today’s 
complexity in servitude law the courts’ fear for unchecked enforcement of servitudes and 
the typical common law fashion by which this judicial control has developed over many 
centuries . Uriel Reichman, Towards a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1179 (1982) [herinafter Reichman I] (“The American law of servitudes remains a murky 
subject burdened with obsolete forms and rules that have caused confusion and 
uncertainty.”). See also  RABIN, EDWARD H., KWALL ROBERTA R. & KWALL JEFFREY L., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 475 (2000) (“The law in this area is an 
unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who ventures in this formidable wilderness never 
emerges unscarred.”).  
17 Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1353 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein]. On this latter point see Section V below. 





of these restrictions in servitude law, proposing unification18 and simplification.19 
State legislators have begun implementing changes to these restrictions. Most 
recently, the American Law Institute has integrated some of these remarks in the 
latest Restatement of Property Law. Already the latest Restatement has been 
criticized for these modifications, which illustrates the lack of consensus with 
regard to this body of law.20 
 
In particular, the requirement of touch and concern is perceived as one 
of the main obstacles to the liberal creation of affirmative servitudes, equitable 
servitudes and real covenants - it is also the only rule that requires analysis of the 
land use arrangement itself.21 As such, it has been poorly understood. Scholars 
have struggled in finding a consensus on the doctrine’s rationale,22 while Courts 
have resorted to various definitions.23 The most recent Restatement (Third) of 
Property Law has abandoned the touch and concern requirement and replaced it 
with a less formal and more open ended test based on “public policy.” Under the 
Restatement a servitude is assumed to be valid unless it determined illegal, 
unconstitutional or in violation of public policy.24  
                                                                 
18 See e.g., Reichman, supra note 16;  French, supra note 16. 
19 James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing 
Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1989); 
Epstein, supra note 17. 
20 See e.g ., Tarlock, supra  note 5. 
21 Margot Rau, Covenants Running with the Land: Viable Doctrine or Common-Law 
Relic?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139 (1978) [hereinafter Rau]. 
22See, infra note 29. 
23 See, infra note 26. 
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, SERVITUDES § 2.4 (section 3.1.)  Section 3.2 of the 
Restatement declares that for a covenant to be valid as a servitude, “neither the burden nor 
the benefit of a covenant is required to touch and concern land.” Covenants should thus 
be permissible, regardless of any substantive requirement of touch and concern, unless it 
infringes upon “a constitutionally protected right, contravenes a statute or governmental 
regulation, or violates public policy”. (section 3.1) Violation of public policy consists, e.g., 
of unreasonable restraint of alienation (3.4.) or unreasonable restraint of trade or 
competition (3.6). The Restatement provides a non-exhaustive list to indicate the content of 
“public policy.” Under Section 3.1, a servitude will be held invalid when it’s content: (1) is 
arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious; (2) imp oses a unreasonable burden on a passes on 
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 When  servitude is considered by law not to “touch and concern” the 
burdened or dominant  land, it will not run with land to bind successors - that is, 
a mere transfer of ownership of the burdened land then defeats the original 
agreement.25 The exact definition of touch and concern is somewhat elusive. A 
survey of case law of the past hundred years reveals a wide range of 
definitions.26 Many pages in the literature have been devoted to the question on 
                                                                                                                                                             
railroads and constitutional right; (3) imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation under 
3.4 and 3.5; (4) unreasonably restrains trade or competition (3.6); (5) is unconscionable 
under 3.7. Note that the requirement against the direct restraint on alienation of the 
burdened estate imposes a Kaldor-Hicks test: The reasonableness is determined by 
weighing the utility of the restraint against the injurious consequences of enforcing the 
restraint (section 3.4). On the other hand, indirect restraints of otherwise valid servitude 
remain valid even if it indirectly restrains alienation by limiting the use that can be made of 
property, by reducing the amount realizable by the owner on sale or other transfer of 
property, or by otherwise reducing the value of the property (section 3.4). Examples of the 
latter include servitudes of view, historical preservation, conservation of habitat. 
25 Spencer’s case laid down the requirement that for a burden of a covenant to run with the 
land and bind assignees it must touch and concern the property, and not merely be 
“collateral.” Landlord Spencer had leased real property to a tenant, who covenanted that 
he, his executors or assigns would build a brick wall on the leased land. The land interest 
was assigned by tenant to J, who assigned to another party who refused to build the wall.  
The court required of covenants that 1) that the parties intende them to run, 2) that there be 
privity of estate, and 3) that the covenant touches and concerns the land. In the end, the 
covenant was held not to bind the defendant on the grounds that intent was lacking – the 
word ‘assigns’ were missing in tenants agreement. Many questions were left open, among 
them the precise meaning of touch and concern. See 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 
1583). American courts extended Spencer’s landlord-tenant relationship to cases 
concerning conveyances in fee and to the running of benefits. The requirement of touch 
and concern was also imposed on equitable servitudes, see E.H. BURN, CHESHIRE’S MODERN 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 583-ff (1972). 
26 A number of judicial decisions on touch and concern regard the test as a matter of 
economic effect. Hereby a promise is considered to touch and concern the land when the 
covenant has economic impact on the value of the land or the title of ownership. Such a 
definition has rightly been criticized in the literature for its circularity, since the courts 
determination regarding touch and concern focuses on whether the covenant affects the 
legal interests of the parties as landowners.(See, Berger , 1970, 210-211). Moreover, 
personal promises can be regarded as to affect the title of the land and will pass the touch 
and concern test without regard to the concern of wasteful fragmentation. From this test it 
has been held that building heights and setback lines (See for example, Fong v. 





the meaning and function of this doctrine27 and it accounts for much of the 
criticism on the complexity of the law of servitudes.28  
                                                                                                                                                             
Hashimoto, 1998 WL 71951 (Hawai'i App.)), restrictions of use for aesthetic purpose (Bluffs 
Div. II Park Protection Ass'n v. Radich, Wash.App. Div. 2, Jun 26, 1998.) and monthly 
maintenance fees run with the land (Palm Beach County v. Cove Club Investors Ltd., 734 
So.2d 379, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S162 (Fla., Apr 08, 1999)). Another broad test, implied from the 
vague description in the Second Restatement of Property (CHECK),  is to assess whether 
the covenant influences the use and enjoyment of the land. Like the previous test, such a 
criterion does not provide any guarantee with regard to the inhibition of personal promises 
or idiosyncratic promises. Under this definition, limitations on use of the land have 
logically been held to run with the land (see, Mains Farm Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Worthington ,121 Wash.2d 810, 854 P.2d  1072 (Wash., Jul 15, 1993). Even limitations to use 
for single benefit residential purposes were held to run (see Meisse v. Family Recreation 
Club, Inc., Ohio App. 2 Dist., Feb 20, 1998), whereas attorneys’ fees were not (see, Paloma 
Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Jenkins ,978 P.2d 110-116). Another recurring test holds that the 
intention of the parties is decisive on whether a promise is personal or running.  On this 
ground, assessment fees for maintenance have been determined to run (see, Bishop v. Twin 
Lakes Golf and Country Club, 89 Wash.App. 1024, 1998 WL 62822), even limitations to use 
for single benefit residential purposes were held to run. In a minority of cases courts hold 
that a promise must affect the legal rights of the covenanting parties as landowners.(see, 
e.g.,Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So.2d 302, Fla.App. 2 Dist., Mar 23, 1966.) Such a 
description partially resembles the original definition, especially if it implies the 
supplementary provision that the covenant must also have no bearing on their legal rights 
as non-owners. In other words, if it were required that the promise is to be useless to the 
beneficiary after he has conveyed the estate, then the test verges on the original definition 
as employed by the English courts. However, the outcome in these cases - which often 
favors personal land promises - negates the presumption that the additional requirement is 
actually implied when this legal-rights affection criteria is set forth. 
27On the definition, test of and policy rule behind the touch and concern doctrine see 
JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW 460 (1997); Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of 
Promises Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167-235, 207-233 (1970) [hereinafter 
Berger]; see also  infra 29. 
28 Criticizing today’s complexity: Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation 
Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2 (1989); Allison Dunham (1982), 
‘Statutory Reformation of Land Obligations’, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1351-1353; Robert C. 
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls, 40 U. CHI L. REV. 681 (1973); Robert C. Ellickson & Dan A. Tarlock, LAND-USE 
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1981); Epstein, supra note 17, at pages 1353-1369; 
French, supra  note 16; Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 143 (1977) [Herinafter Reichman II]. Much of the frustration is due to the (alleged) 
indeterminancy of the test; see Olin. L. Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 
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 Several legal scholars have attempted to explain the purpose of this 
doctrine and to guide its interpretation although no definite test for the touch and 
concern requirement has emerged.29 Some have proposed that the requirement 
                                                                                                                                                             
MICH. L. REV. 13 (1978) [hereinafter Browder], arguing that unstated and poorly conceived 
policy concerns lie at the heart of the indeterminate manner by which courts have handled 
the issue of touch and concern. On judicial manipulation of touch and concern in order to 
achieve predetermined results, see e.g., Rau, supra  note 21, at pages 163-169; Susan F. 
French, Susan F., Servitudes, Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation, 
Doctrines, and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 940 (1988) [hereinafter 
French II]. 
29 On ethical and other possible socio-economic purposes of the touch and concern rule, 
see Reichman II, supra  note 28 . In Tarlock’s view, touch and concern assures subsequent 
purchasers that there is a reasonable relationship between the financial obligations and the 
benefits to their property. See Tarlock, supra  note 5, at p. 813. As such, the modern 
function of touch and concern is to prevent frustration of purpose on behalf of the non 
expectant or uninformed purchaser of burdened land. Similarly, according to Clark, the real 
policy behind touch and concern is to give effect to the intent that most people would have 
given to the agreement. See CLARK II, supra note 12. Therefore, the test would be whether 
the usual expectation of the well-informed layman would accord with the servitude right 
(For more on Clark’s interpretation of touch and concern, see Reichman II, supra  note 28). 
This proposal, advocated also by Berger reveals touch and concern as a device for intent 
effectuation, through which the law conforms itself to the normal, usual or probable 
understandings of the community (Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises 
Respecting the Use of Land, 55 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 167; see also  Browder, supra note 
28, at pages 13-46; on the combination of the intent and the touch and concern requirement 
by courts, see Rau, supra note 21, at page 155). Such an approach leaves many questions 
unresolved. For instance, what is the normal expectation of the layman? When will we 
impose the ‘normal’ expectation above a idiosyncratic but perfectly legitimate 
understanding between the original parties? Furthermore, how does this relate to the intent 
requirement itself? In an attempt to validate touch and concern on economic grounds, 
Jeffrey Stake’s efficiency proposition is that courts use touch and concern to allow those 
promises to run with the land that are more efficiently allocated to the successors than to 
the original party to the covenant - typically evaluated when the estate is transferred; when 
then the question of touch and concern is most demanding. The hypothesis is that when 
there is no existing service available as an alternative to the covenant, the burden should 
touch and concern. If, however, the service is commercially available, the burden should 
not touch and concern. For instance, in the case where the promisor promises large water 
supply from the source on his land, which is the most adequate water source near the place 
of performance, the court should anticipate the consequences of transfer of the estate. Is it 
efficient to hold the original promisor/seller liable to the performance?  In this case, he 





be abandoned altogether.30 However, despite these efforts by scholars and the 
drafters of the Third Restatement, touch and concern remains is very much alive 
in the case law today.31 Hence, there are still many unanswered questions.  What 
is the purpose of the doctrine of touch and concern and what would be an 
adequate definition, given functional use? What does it mean for a promise to 
                                                                                                                                                             
would either need to supply water from a distant place to the beneficiary tract or negotiate 
with his successor for performance of the covenant. Stake’s focus is primarily on the cost 
comparison between the promisor and his successor on the one hand, and between the 
promisee and his successor on the other hand, not on the costs that may arise out of a 
need to negotiate between promisor's successor and promisee (or his successor). The 
hypothesis is that when there is no existing service available as an alternative to the 
covenant, the burden should touch and concern. If, however, the service is commercially 
available the burden should not touch and concern. For example, according to Stake's 
efficiency test, promises not to do something on the promisor's land have to run. It will 
always be the successor of the interest in the estate who will be better equipped to prevent 
certain acts on the land (e.g. not to build). If the original party were personally obliged to 
perform the act, it would involve serious transaction costs (according to Stake). But what if 
the covenant not to build dates from an area in time where the parcel lied in a rural, 
picturesque site, but now is situated in a industrial area? The successor, let's assume a 
project developer, will have to negotiate all the servitudes not to build which are attached 
to the land parcel. Although the successor is the cheapest cost provider if the promise in 
terms of own private cost, the total costs to society of having the promise run with the land 
might well be negative. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Towards and Economic Understanding of 
Touch and Concern , 1998 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 925, 959 (1998) [hereinafter Stake]. Stake 
assumes that the burden should run with the land, unless the promisee can hire existing 
business as an alternative performer. Nevertheless, it is unclear why the seller will not have 
an incentive to contractually bind the buyer to supply the water. Moreover, even if such 
contractual solution does not take place, the monopolistic pricing will merely occasion a 
redistribution of wealth (from old owner to new owner) and not a deadweight loss, given 
the perfect inelasticity of demand (i.e., the full quantity of water originally contracted for by 
the benefit of the land will still be delivered, with no contraction of resources).  
30 See Epstein, supra  note 17 (public records of land obfuscate the need for a touch and 
concern requirement). See also  French II, supra note 28; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY, SERVITUDES. 
31 The authors conducted a case law survey on the Lexis Nexis (“Legal > Cases - U.S. > 
Federal & State Cases; text ("touch and concern")”). Our survey reveals  that, measured 
over an 18-year span, touch and concern remains a permanent fixture in the case law on 
land use arrangements. Measured over 4-year intervals from between 1982 and 2002, touch 
and concern arises respectively 55, 52, 50 and 57 times. Over 1-year intervals between 199 
and 2002 is arises respectively 18, 6, 9 and 10 times. More details are on file with authors. 
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benefit “land” and not its owner and why there is not a category of promises that 




B. Civil Law Restrictions 
 
 Under feudalism, the system of servitudes was greatly extended beyond 
its origin in Roman law.33 This can be seen as part of a general trend under feudal 
law whereby the notion of absolute ownership underwent a substantial change. 
The primary type of property during the feudal era was domaine éminent or 
direct of the lord where ownership vested on a series of interests in the same 
property.34 Later on, the domaine éminent was reduced to a series of charges 
or servitudes that were imposed not only on the land but also on the tenant - in 
most cases involving labor obligations.35 In the post-revolutionary days, 
servitudes, perceived as a manifestation of the feudal hierarchy of fiefdom and 
subinfeudination, were severely curtailed. This hostility towards the free use of 
property was carried over into the influential post-revolutionary Civil Code of 
1804.36 As a result, “freedom of contract is quite seriously restricted in the 
matter of servitudes” under civil law.37 This hostility is reflected principally in two 
                                                                 
32 Berger, supra  note 29, at page 210. 
33 See Generally, F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 160 (1952); E. GLASSON, L’HISTOIRE DU DROIT 
FRANEAIS 188-208 (1904). 
34 GANSHOF, supra note 33. 
35 See AUBENAS, COURS D’HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE 92 (1955). 
36  The Civil Code of 1804 still applies today in Belgium and France. Although the civil 
codes of Belgium and France have diverted over the years, the provisions relating to 
servitudes have remained identical. For an excellent overview, see Paul McCarthy, The 
Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in France and Belgium: Judicial Discretion and 
Urban Planning, 93 COLUMB. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1973) [herinafter McCarthy], citing J. 
CARBONNIER, 1 DROIT CIVIL 57-58 (7d. ed. 1967). 
37 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT , TREATISE ON CIVIL LAW, Vol. 1, Part 2, 2928 (1880) 
[hereinafter PLANIOL AND RIPERT]. See also J.B. VANIER, LES SERVITUDES (1886) (includes a 
detailed account on the history and framework of the French civil code provisions on 
servitudes). 





concepts of Continental property law: the concept of nominate property rights 




1. Nominate and Innominate Property Rights 
 
Most modern European codes limit land use arrangements to a number of 
specific, socially desirable property rights.38 This favoring of certain property 
arrangements is known as the numerus clausus principle and is an important 
expression of the fundamental principle of unity that underlies modern property 
law. The numerus clausus doctrine contains the notion that no real property 
rights may be created other than those provided by the law.39 The purpose of 
this principle is to forestall private individuals from creating property rights that 
differ from those that are expressly recognized by the legal system.40   
  In many ways the intellectual product of the French revolution, 
the influence of the numerus clausus principle is felt today in most modern 
European codes. The Napoleonic Code of 1804,41 the German BGB of 1900,42 
                                                                 
38 European scholars also refer to this principle by invoking the concept of nominate 
property rights. Merrill and Smith have recognized that, although the numerus clausus 
principle is mostly a Roman law doctrine followed and enforced in most civil law countries, 
the principle also exists as part of the unarticulated tradition of the common law. Thomas 
Merill and Henry Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 69 (2000).  Merrill and Smith illustrate the many ways in 
which common law judges are accustomed to thinking in terms comparable to the civilian 
doctrine. 
39 Cass. 16th of September 1996, J.T. 1967, 59 and R.C.J.B. 1968, 166 - note Hansenne. 
40 For a modern challenge to the numerus clausus principle, see Bernard Rudden, Economic 
Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 239 (J. Eekelaar & J. Bell eds. 3d ed. 1987) (critical analysis of the legal, 
philosophical, and economic justifications for limiting the types of legally cognized 
property interests to a handful of standardized forms).  
41 Several articles of the French Civil Code embrace the concept of “typicality” of real rights 
and articulate principles of unitary and absolute property. See, e.g. Article 516 on the 
differentiation of property; Article 526, enlisting the recognized forms of limited real rights 
(usufruct, servitudes and mortgages); Articles 544 - 546 on the definition and necessary 
content of absolute ownership, etc. 
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and several other codifications43 contain provisions that restrict the creation (or at 
least withhold the enforcement) of atypical property rights. As Rudden aptly put 
it, “in very general terms, all systems limit, or at least greatly restrict, the creation 
of real rights: ‘fancies’ are for contract, not property.”44 These limits on the 
creation of atypical property rights eventually emerged as a general principle of 
modern property law.45 Even jurisdictions that have not formally codified the 




2. Predial and Personal Servitudes 
 
 With regard to servitudes, the hostility to the creation of land use 
arrangements is formulated most clearly in the requirement of ‘prediality’.47 
                                                                                                                                                             
42 BGB Paragraph 90, by providing that “Only corporeal objects are things in the legal 
sense” can be seen as a substantial departure from the feudal conception of property, 
where most atypical rights a non-tangible nature. 
43 Practically all important modern codifications – not all of which were directly influenced 
by the French and German models – embrace a similar principle of unity in property. 
Rudden, supra  note 33, provides a comparative survey of the numerus clausus principle in 
the modern legal systems of the world, reporting that many Asian legal systems have 
adopted a basic  rule according to which ‘no real rights can be created other than those 
provided for in this Code or other a legislation’ e.g., Korean CC 185, Thai CC 1298, and 
Japanese CC 175. Similar provisions exist in other systems of direct European derivation 
such as in the La. CC 476-8, Argentinian CC 2536, Ethiopian CC 1204 (2), and Israeli Land 
Law 1969 sections 2-5. 
44 Rudden, supra  note 40, at 243. 
45 European scholars also refer to this principle by invoking the concept of nominate 
property rights. Merrill and Smith (2000, p. 69) have recognized that, although the numerus 
clausus principle is mostly a Roman law doctrine followed and enforced in most civil law 
countries, the principle also exists as part of the unarticulated tradition of the common law. 
The authors illustrate the many ways in which common law judges are accustomed to 
thinking in terms comparable to the civilian doctrine. 
46 See, for instance, the Blieck case in Belgium, see Cass. 16th of September 1996, J.T. 1967, 
59 and R.C.J.B. 1968, 166 - note Hansenne. Here ____. 
47 See e.g. Article 637 French Civil Code C.C. [herinafter cited as C.C.]; Article 1119 Greek 
Civil Code; §1018 & 1019 German Civil Code (Bürgerkichesgesetzbuch) [hereinafter cited as 





Prediality, which finds its doctrinal origin in the Roman law concept of 
“servitudes praediorum”48,  holds that both burden and benefit bear on to land 
(an “immovable”) rather than a person: “A servitude is a charge imposed upon 
one parcel for the use and enjoyment of a parcel belonging to another owner.”49 
The requirement of prediality, largely equivalent to the touch and concern 
restrictions in common law, prevents the running of personal promises in many 
civil law system. The requirement of prediality holds that only those land 
promises which are of ‘real’ nature, tied to estates rather than persons, may run 
with the land. Promises of personal nature are personal obligations, not real 
rights, and as such they do not pertain the characteristics of a real right, the most 
important of which is the capacity to run with the land.50 
                                                                                                                                                             
B.G.B.); Art. 730 Swiss Civil Code; Art. 1027 Italian Civil Code. The term refers to predia 
from Latin, as it pertains exclusively to immovable goods. The requirement that a servitude 
is “praedial” is coined as the requirement of prediality in the Louisiana civil code (Article 
646) [hereinafter cited as La. C.C.]. Servitudes (a requirement of ‘prediality’, as opposed to 
‘personal’) are termed predial to refer to the establishment of land as the principal 
beneficiary (predium) of the promise. Under Lousiana law a predial servitude is defined as a 
“charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate”. For more on the 
requirement of prediality in Lousiana, see A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES 9-ff 
(1997); see also  B. Kozolchyk, Book Review: On Predial Servitudes, Civil Law Institutions 
and Common Law Attitudes- Apropos of Yiannopoulos’ Predial Servitudes, 59 TUL. L. 
REV. 571 (1984); William H. McClendon, Book Review: Predial Servitudes by A.N. 
Yiannopoulos, 44 LA. L. REV. 87 (1984). 
48 The Roman jurisconsults required that “there be a natural relationship between the object 
of the servitude and the use of dominant land”. See PLANIOL & RIPERT , supra  note 33, at p. 
2932; M. PARDESSUS , TRAITE DES SERVITUDES 23-34 (1810). 
49 “The service should be established, not in favor of a person but for land” (686 C.C.). The 
burdened land is referred to as “servient,” the land that stands to benefit is called 
“dominant.” Furthermore, affirmative obligations are not recognized as servitudes, see for 
example article 669 of the La.C.C. (MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT , TRAITÉ PARTIQUE DE 
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 919 (2d ed. 1952)). 
50 Furthermore, French courts imposed restrictions on the use of servitudes in land 
arrangements. The covenant must have been intended to bind subsequent holders of the 
property in question (Guyomarc’h v. Coste, [1964] A.J.P.I. 947, [1964] Gaz. Pal. I. 229 (Cass. 
Civ. 1re 1963), [1965] J.C.P. II. 14215 (Cass. Civ. 1 re 1965)). Also, the covenant has to 
conform to all the limitations imposed by the Civil Code on all servitudes, the most 
important of which was that it must benefit the owner in the use and enjoyment of his 
estate rather than his personal capacity (McCarthy, supra  note 36). 
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 The requirement of prediality essentially means that there must be a 
“benefit to the dominant estate”. In this regard, “a principle of utility [...] sets the 
outer limits of party autonomy in the field of predial servitudes.51 By this token, 
servitudes that serve no useful purpose or expected social benefit will not be 
awarded status of predial servitude. In its weak form, prediality requires that a 
servitude right is formulated by the parties as to derive utility from the servient 
estate rather than ascribed to a designated owner.52 In strong from, the 
requirement of prediality entails that servitude obligation must be of such a nature 
that the land itself derives utility, regardless of the personal capacity of future or 





 The legal concept of numerus clausus, prediality, and touch and 
concern  contrast sharply with the doctrine of freedom of contract, namely that 
two parties to a private contract may agree on virtually any arrangement without 
government limitations.54 The dichotomy between these contract and property 
paradigms results in a general tension between the principle of freedom to 
                                                                 
51 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra  note 47, at pages 9, 32, including references to the origins in 
Roman law of this principle, at footnote 16. 
52 Id.,  p. 33: “a servitude in favor of a named owner of an estate for the enjoyment of a 
swimming pool or of a tennis court in another estate is a limited personal servitude; but the 
same stipulation in favor of an estate, or any owner of an estate, gives rise to a predial 
servitude,” with reference to Plaisance v. Gros, 378 So.2d 178 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1979).  
53Contrary to other civilian systems, Lousiana Civil Law explicitly provides that, in the 
absence of indications that the right is granted for the benefit of an estate or a particular 
person, a presumption of prediality will apply when the right granted is “of a nature to 
confer an advantage on an estate” (Article 733); the converse assumption applies when the 
right granted “is mereley for the convenience of a person” (Article 734). 
54 Merrill and Smith note the peculiar dichotomy between property and contracts, 
observing that while contract rights are freely customizable, property rights are restricted to 
a closed list of standardized forms. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1 
(2000). 





contract and the societal need for standardization in property law. All Western 
Continental legal systems, including the modern European codifications, reflect 
this tension. Freedom of contract is promoted by recognizing and fully enforcing 
both nominate and innominate, and both predial and personal, forms of contract. 
Yet, at the same time, they limit private autonomy in property transactions and 
only enforce transactions pertaining to standardized (or nominate) forms of 
property.55 This fundamental distinction between property and contract, although 
almost universal, remains poorly understood.56 Why does freedom of contracting 
remain curtailed with regard to valuable assets in a time where freedom of 
contract is generally lauded?57 Why are personal contracts on land outside of 
property law? What does it mean when “land” rather than “owners” need to 




                                                                 
55  This implies that property rights are only enforced with real remedies if they conform to 
one of the “named” standardized categories. Conversely, the presumption is the opposite 
in the field of contracts: the legal system enforces all types of contracts unless they violate 
a mandatory rule of law concerning their object and scope. 
56 Merrill and Smith suggest that the goal of rules such as numerus clausus is the 
minimization of information costs. Because of the long-term (or perpetual) nature of most 
property arrangements, it is necessary to package property transactions in such a way that 
subsequent purchasers can easily recognize and respect their nature and content. See 
Merrill & Smith, supra note 54. Compare Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, 
Property, Contract, and Verifiability: Understanding the law's Restrictions on Divided 
Rights, 2 THE BERKELEY LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS 9  (2001). This argument fails 
to consider that information cost arguments cannot easily explain a large number of 
doctrines. Vertical and horizontal forms of fragmentation, for example, pose similar 
informational problems. Yet, legal systems are less liberal in permitting one form of 
fragmentation than the other. See Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 701-738 (2002). By the same token, most real covenants are 
as easily recordable and tractable as other real servitudes, yet legal systems treat such 
rights quite differently in terms of recognition and remedial protection.  Most generally, 
information cost explanations lose most of their cogency as new information technologies 
increase the possibility of real-time and inexpensive access to public records. Nevertheless, 
the strong presumption against judicial recognition of new forms of property retains its 
power across legal systems.  
57 See F.H. BUCKLEY, FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1999). 
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II. A FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION OF SERVITUDE LAW:  
THE ECONOMICS OF FRAGMENTATION AND THE LAW OF ENTROPY 
  
The restrictions on the free creation of servitudes become more 
intelligible when one appreciates that servitudes do not merely bring exchange 
benefits but also present lurking dangers for societal benefits. 
 
 The legal framework of land use law gains clarity when one regards 
servitudes as a partitioning of property rights.58 Servitudes fulfill the function of 
dividing user rights between separately held possessory estates. This way they 
allow the acquisition of ‘owner’s entitlements’ instead of the more expensive 
possession itself.59 In establishing a servitude, the use rights over a certain estate 
are divided among the owner and non-possessory servitude beneficiary. In 
economic terms, servitudes thus present a division of property rights where 
several parties obtain exclusionary right as to one particular estate.60 Also, in the 
legal sense, it is sometimes recognized that the act of establishment of a servitude 
                                                                 
58 The “partitioning of property rights” we refer to is best defined by Alchian, and can be 
described as the situation when several people each possess some portion of the rights to 
use the land. See Armen A. Alchian,, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 (4) IL 
POLITICO 816 (1965). Alchian also provides examples of private land use arrangements such 
as servitudes (e.g. the right to grow wheat on it, to dump ashes over it,...).  
59 See Reichman I, supra  note 6, 1184 (“These benefits would not be easily accomplished 
but for the largely positive attitude demonstrated by the Courts”). 
60 Readers, in particular those with a background in law, should note that legal conceptions 
and economic conceptions of the term ‘property right’ do not fully coincide. A ‘property 
right’, in the legal sense, typically  refers to a relationship between a person and a good 
which is regarded “own, proper, propre, eigen” to the person. When we refer to ‘property 
rights’ in this article, we do not refer to any strictly outlined legal concept, but rather to the 
economic conception of property rights. To the economist, a property right refers simply to 
a class of rights that offers ‘institutionally protected possibilities of individuals or groups 
to exert control on the actual or future use, and/or consumption, and/or allocation of a 
scarce resource.’ It shall be clear that the range of this definition is very broad, covering 
various legal rights, beyond those assumed under a strict legal notion of property. For 
instance, to the lawyer, a right of use is merely a derivative right (servitude, dienstbarheid, 
erfdienstbaarheid) from property itself. However, a right of use over land falls within the 
economic definition of ‘property rights’ since it bestows actual control over use and 
consumption of the resource to the owner of the servitude (e.g., the same applies to other 
derivative rights such as usufructus, trespass, etc). 





is an alienation of a part of the property, whereby the laws governing alienation 
of property apply.61 
 
 Economic theory describes the potential societal costs of excessive 
property fragmentation.62 In the presence of complementarities, the use of 
resources independently controlled by different individuals leads to underuse and 
overpricing 63  
                                                                 
61 See YIANNOPOULOS, supra  note 47, at 329, with reference to 708 La. Civil Code. 
62 Originally coined by Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on 
the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1165-
1258 (1968), Michael Heller revitalized the concept of anticommons property. In an article 
on the transition to market institutions in contemporary Russia, Heller discusses the 
intriguing prevalence of empty storefronts. Stores in Moscow are subject to underuse 
because there are too many owners (local, regional and federal government agencies, 
maffia, etc.) holding rights of exclusion. The definition of the anticommons as employed by 
Heller, a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective rights of exclusion in a 
scarce resource, provides a powerful tool for property theory. See Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 621 (1998). For a recent treatment of the danger of over-
fragmentation see e.g. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE 
LAW REVIEW 1163-1223 (1999) (recognizing a “boundary principle” in property law that 
purports to prevent excessive fragmentation; and criticising the Supreme Court’s violation 
of the above principle by way of protecting increasingly minimal property fragments in a 
recent number of cases).  See also  Michael M. Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents 
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE (1998), 
excerpted as Upstream Patents = Downstream Bottlenecks in 41.3 LAW QUADRANGLE 
NOTES  93-97 (Fall/Winter 1998) (cautioning against the stationary effects of upstream 
patens on downstream patent markets); Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging 
Platform Technologies, 29 (2) J. OF LEGAL STUD. 615 (2001) (identifying externalities in 
emerging markets of platform technology and peripheral sellers); Ben Depoorter & 
Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 (4) 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 453-473 (2002) (upholding the usefulness – 
from a strategic costs perspective – of fair use in copyright law in the digital era); Thomas 
J. Miceli & and C.F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; or, Breaking Up Is (Not) Hard to 
Do, 29 (2) J. OF LEGAL STUD. 783 (2000) (examining the modern statutory remedy that allows 
courts to order forced sale of an undivided land under joint ownership). 
63 James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons 
Property, 43 J. LAW &  ECON. 1 (2000) (demonstrating that the price charged by 
complementary monopolists is higher than that of a single agent monopolist); Norbert 
Schulz, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General 
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 The problem of fragmentation derives from a positive externality due to 
complementary features of exclusive use rights. The right to exclude is embedded 
in the control that each property owner exercises over the use of the common 
resource by other agents. Property excluders do not capture the external effects 
of their individual decisions.  This leads to an excessive level of exclusion, with 
underutilization of the joint property as a result.  
 
When ex-post opportunities arise which require exclusive use of various 
individual property right on a land parcel, these various fragments become 
complementary inputs into a more productive unit. Deadweight losses of 
underutilization or underinvestment occur when transaction costs create an 
impediment for an effective rebundling of complementary inputs. The specific 
characteristics of servitudes, whereby burdens on land may run with the land in 
perpetuity, requiring positive action to reaggregate the fragmented rights, amplify 
the danger of excessive fragmentation.64  
 
Consider a setting where A, owner of property Blackacre, has granted 
servitudes on Blackacre to B (to let B’s children play in the backyard) and to 
neighbour C (not to barbecue on the left side of the house). D, who has 
purchased Blackacre from A, and who wants to construct a department 
warehouse on Blackacre will be confronted with the existing easements granted 
by A. D needs to gather the fragmented property bundles from each monopoly 
holder in order to optimize the scale benefits from the new need. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Model, 158 (4) J. OF INST. & THEOR. ECON. 594-613 (2002) (proposing that the anticommons 
deadweight losses are an increasing function in the following three factors: (a) number of 
property fragments; (b) degree of complementarity of such fragments in subsequent uses; 
and (c) independence of the pricing of such inputs by the fragmented property owners).  
64 Posner intuitively recognized the costs of excessive fragmentation in the law of 
servitudes. The common law distinction between promises that attach to the land and 
restrictive covenants that are merely personal is explained in this light. In his words: “One 
problem is that having too many sticks in the bundle of rights that is property increases the 
costs of transferring property” POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 61 (3d ed. 1986). 





 Of course, according to Coase’s theorem, such initial partitioning of 
property rights does not matter for the allocation of resources when all rights are 
freely transferable and transaction costs are zero.65 Reaggregation into clusters 
through voluntary transactions between the individual owners will maximize total 
value of the resources. Once the ideal conditions of the positive Coase theorem 
are relaxed, over-fragmentation poses an engaging incident of “asymmetric 
transaction costs.”66 The presence of such asymmetry is due to the fact that the 
reunification of fragmented rights usually involves transaction and strategic costs 
of a greater magnitude than those incurred for the original fragmentation of the 
right. The intuition for such asymmetry is quite straightforward. A single owner 
faces no strategic costs when deciding how to partition his property. Conversely, 
multiple non-conforming co-owners are faced with a strategic problem, given the 
interdependence of their decisions. These strategic costs increase the transaction 
costs of any attempted reunification of the fragments into a unified bundle.  
 
 In the example above, the new owner D faces transaction costs and 
costs of strategic behavior and cognitive error that may surmount those incurred 
in the original division of Blackacre. The vice of the anticommons lies in the fact 
that the above mentioned costs not only manifest themselves as quasi-rents in the 
period of direct negotiation, but also influence behavior when they are an 
opportunity cost for the entrepreneur, not yet committed to the venture. 
Otherwise profitable projects will be foregone if the costs from externalities, free 
riders, and holdouts are too great. When transaction costs, strategic behavior 
and cognitive error by multiple owners with rights of exclusion prevent the 
successful bundling of complementary inputs into value enhancing opportunities,  
potential value may be wasted.67 In this manner arrangements such as covenants 
                                                                 
65 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
66 Francesco Parisi, The Asymmetric Coase Theorem: Dual Remedies for Unified Property, 
01-13 GEORGE MASON LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER 1. (2002). 
67 Interestingly, legal systems often encourage open access to common property (e.g., 
roads, navigation, communications, ideas after the expiration of intellectual property rights, 
etc.). See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). Rose describes the origins of, and 
justifications for, common law doctrines and statutory strategies that vest collective 
property rights in the “unorganized” public as a means of optimal resource management. 
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and easements that run with the land may impede land development. 
Interestingly, the problem is exasperated when multiple parties are involved.68 
Since today’s predominant instance of land use arrangements running with the 
land has shifted from two-party uses to the governance of common interest 
communities,69 the relevance of the economic model of fragmentation is 
amplified.70 
                                                                                                                                                             
Most recently, Smith introduced the notion of semi-commons. See Henry E. Smith, 
Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 
(2000). These property arrangements consist of a mix of both common and private rights, 
with significant interactions between the two. Smith observes that this property structure 
allows the optimizing of the scale of different uses of the property (e.g. larger-scale grazing, 
smaller-scale grain growing, etc.) and in other cases the legal system creates and facilitates 
fragmentation. For instance, the social planner uses entropy to his benefit by using 
conservation easements and the fragmentation (e.g. multiplication) of administrative 
agencies overseeing of land development to slow the pace of suburban development. The 
idea of the anticommons in environmental regulation is explored further in Julia D. 
Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 
739 (2002). In yet other instances, the owners themselves structure the non-conforming 
property arrangements. Most recently, Dagan and Heller present the case of the liberal 
commons as a compelling illustration of efficient commons.  Hanoch Dagan, and Michael 
Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001). Less obviously, we could imagine 
cases of purposely chosen anticommons. Examples of purposeful dysfunctional property 
fragmentation can be found in situations where unified property owners want to generate 
anticommons problems as a way to control the use of their property beyond the time of 
their ownership. An interesting real-life example is offered by the case of nature 
associations and mountain-hiking clubs that utilize anticommons-type fragmentation as a 
way to ensure long-term or perpetual conservation of the land in its current undeveloped 
state.).Although problematic as a rule, non-conforming partitioning of property rights may 
be somewhat sensible in achieving specific policy goals or other objectives that property 
owners desire. These idiosyncratic arrangements are both a reflection of the individual’s 
right to freedom of contract and a legitimate policy instrument for the urban planner. In 
sum, respecting individual autonomy while minimizing the undesirable deadweight losses 
that could result from these arrangements is the critical goal. See Francesco Parisi, Freedom 
of Contract and the Laws of Entropy, 10 SUPREME COURT ECON. REV. 65-90 (2002). 
68 Schulz, Parisi & Depoorter, supra  note 63. See also  Depoorter & Parisi, supra  note 62.  
69 See e.g. Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 Duke L.J. 75 
(1998); Wayne S. Hyatt, Symposium: Common Interest Communities: Evolution and 
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1998); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Symposium: 
Common Interest Development Communities: Part Ii: Changing the Rules: Should Courts 
Limit the Power of Common Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners' Privileges in the 






An intuitive understanding of the dangers of overfragmentation may thus 
provide insight into the reluctance of legal systems to grant property right 
protection to atypical property rights. As we demonstrate below, these insight 
shed light on the complicated matter of servitude law. The unbounded creation of 
all types of servitudes may be costly from a societal perspective. Yet, the 
question remains why we recognize certain land use contracts as property rights 
and refer others to the realm of personal contract. In the following Section, we 




III. MINIMIZING FRAGMENTATION LOSSES: FROM EX-ANTE TO EX-POST  
 
 
A. Common Law: From Touch and Concern to the New Restatement 
 
 
1. The Ex Ante Approach of Touch and Concern 
 
 Property right divisions create asymmetric transaction costs. Unlike 
ordinary transfers of rights from one individual to another, bundling fragmented 
property rights usually involves transaction and strategic costs higher than those 
incurred in the original act of division.71 These costs increase with the extent of 
fragmentation. In real property arrangements, this asymmetry generates a one-
directional stickiness in the transfer of legal entitlements. Even reversing a simple 
property transaction can result in monopoly pricing by the buyer-turned-seller; 
reunifying property that has been split among multiple parties engenders even 
                                                                                                                                                             
Face of Vested Expectations?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1081 (1998);  Mark Fenster, 
Community by Covenant, Process, and Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary 
Common Interest Community,  15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 3 (1999); David C. Drewes, 
Note: Putting the "Community" Back in Common Interest Communities: a Proposal for 
Participation-Enhancing Procedural Review, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 314 (2001).  
70 In this regard with respectfully disagree with Professor Gordley. 
71 Schulz, Parisi & Depoorter, supra  note 63. 
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higher costs given the increased difficulty of coordination among the parties and 
the increased opportunity for strategic pricing by the multiple sellers.72 An 
understanding the dangers of property fragmentation reveals a rationale for the 
age-old concept of touch and concern. As we shall see below, fragmentation 
theory also provides guidance the propensity and definition of touch and 
concern. 
 
 In Mayor of Congleton v. Pattison, we find the original definition of 
touch and concern, advanced as a matter of objective determination. A covenant 
touches and concerns the land if it “affect[s] the nature, quality or value of the 
thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances; or if it affected the 
mode of enjoying it,”73 and not – as in Vyoyan v. Arthur74 – “if it is not 
beneficial without regard to his continuing ownership of the estate” in which case 
it is “a mere collateral covenant upon which the assignee cannot sue.”75 In a more 
recent applications of the formal, instrinsic test, several courts held that a 
servitude touches and concern the land if it affects the parties’ interests as 
landowners’ such that the benefits and burdens could not exist independent 
of their ownership in the real property.76  
                                                                 
72 Once fragmentation takes place, reunification requires the involvement of multiple 
parties, with transaction and strategic costs increasing with the number of parties. This 
creates a one-directional stickiness in the process of reallocating property among different 
levels of fragmentation.  
73 Mayor of Congleton v. Pattison, 103 Eng. Rep. 725, 727 (K.B. 1808). 
74 5 Co.16 2 (1583). 
75 See also , Hutchinson v. Thomas, 190 Pa. 242, 42 A. 681;  C.H.S. PRESTON & G.H. NEWSOM, 
RESTICTIVE COVENANTS AFFECTING FREEHOLD LAND 15 (1939):  “the protected land itself 
must be affected by the observance or non-observance of the covenants. On the one hand 
it is not enough that some personal advantage can be derived therefrom by successive 
owners.”’ The earliest leading cases on touch and concern consist of, e.g., Kelly v. Barrett 
[1924] 2 Ch. 379; Rogers v. HoseGood, [1900] 2 Ch. 388; Zetland v. Driver, [1937] Ch. 651; 
Re Ballard , [1937] Ch. 473. 
76 JOSEPH W. SINGER,  PROPERTY LAW (1997), citing Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 182-183 
(N.C.1992), POWELL, supra  note 12, at 60-41 and  RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, §537 (1944). 
See, e.g., Columbia Club, Inc. v. American Fletcher Realty Corp., 720 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. 
App., Dec 03, 1999), where the obligation to maintain a  drain tile was held to run because it 
was buried on the land. 






In the original definition of touch and concern, real promises are assumed 
to benefit the land itself and not the individual land holder. Of course, land use 
promises never truly benefit “land,” they affect the “owners” of the land. How are 
we then to appreciate the supposedly objective, land-related nature of land use 
arrangement, as prescribed by the original definition of touch and concern?  
  
This Article holds that, by excluding the running of personal promises, 
touch and concern reduces the inefficient use of land. By preventing the creation 
of atypical property rights, touch and concern bars the running of many land use 
arrangements that are most likely to impose deadweight losses upon society - 
even though the running of the agreement may create surplus for the contracting 
parties. What is the problem with atypical, personal property rights? 
 
 Personal, idiosyncratic agreements intrinsically have a higher probability 
of becoming obsolete once the ownership of the beneficent tract is transferred. 
More specifically, the original narrow definition may be understood as an attempt 
to allow the running of only those types of promises that will stand the test of 
time.77  The paramount type of arrangements that may meet that objective are 
those that flow from the natural use of the property, with no regard to the 
preference set of the present or future owner. Such intrinsic land use 
arrangements provide a formal barrier against the creation of atypical property 
rights and are to be regarded as the paramount type of land use arrangements 
that fits the original definition of touch and concern.78 
 
                                                                 
77 In this vain, Alexander's reading of Posner’s law-and-economics analysis of touch and 
concern ascribes the idea that running covenants effectuate intent “by enforcing promises 
that, absent transaction costs, would have survived successive rounds of bargaining 
among subsequent generations of owners” (see G.S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion and 
the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883 (1998), with references at note 25 to POSNER, 
supra note 64, at 588-59; and Krier, Book Review, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1664, 1678-1680). 
78On the origin of touch and concern in English law, see CLARK, supra note 12, at pages 12-
20. 
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Intrinsic servitudes that have a natural relation to the use of the land  
stand a greater chance of standing the test of time and will not need be removed 
when land is transferred. For instance, a subsequent buyer is likely to have, 
similar to the previous owner, a preference for retaining a view over the beach 
shore. Such “preference continuity” is less likely when a servitude pertains to a 
highly personal preference of the original party. 
 
From a policy perspective, the decision to let a servitude run involves a 
tradeoff between the expected transaction costs and deadweight losses from 
removing the servitude when it transfer with the estate versus the costs of re-
negotiating the original servitude when it does not transfer with the land. If the 
former outweigh the latter, a servitude should be allowed to run with the land and 
vice versa. As a substantive requirement, touch and concern thus bars the 
enforcement of non-intrinsic promises that are prima facie expected to create 
deadweight losses of fragmentation. 
 
 Consider the following equation: 
      
     p C(ATC) = (1 - p) C(T) 
      
Where p is the probability that there will be a change in use such as to create 
anticommons costs, C(ATC). (1 - p) represents the converse probability that the 
initial transfer remains efficient and that, by not letting it transfer with the estate, 
individuals are forced to face a new transaction cost of re-negotiating the original 
servitude C(T).79 This equation illustrates the tilt point between efficient transfer 
versus non-transfer of a promise attached to land.80 If judges were perfectly 
informed they would be able to employ this formula as an ad hoc rest whenever 
                                                                 
79 The probability of these costs lead Epstein to believe that no external doctrinal 
mechanism can ex-ante predict and reduce future transaction costs. Rather, the parties to 
the original transaction are in the best position to discount future transaction cost in the 
current value of the land, see infra  Section IV. 
80 The equation could be supplemented by integrals with time and discount rates. The 
costs of fragmentation (ATC) are faced at a later point in time, while the renegotiation costs 
(T) are faced immediately. With high discount rates, one would want to let relatively more 
arrangements transfer with the estate. 





questions arose as to the running of a promise. In reality, the formidable weighing 
costs involved in such a test would add great uncertainty to the assessment of 
servitudes. 
 Therefore it is perhaps understandable that the requirement of touch and 
concern remains a matter of positive law. Promises that clearly fall within one 
category are barred from running and those that do not may run with the land. A 
land use that is related to the natural use of the land is likely to satisfy (1 - p) 
C(T) > p C(ATC), because the expected costs of not letting the agreement run 
with the land (they will need to be renegotiated whenever the title to the land 
changes hands) outweighs the expected of costs of letting the agreement run (a 
new owner will need to negotiate release or termination of the promise). For 
example, without running with the land to pass to successive owners, a promise 
to allow natural water flow downstream from one parcel (dominant) to another 
parcel (servient) will require negotiations for the reinstallment of the promise 
every time ownership of one of the parcels change. On the other hand, allowing a 
personal promise to run – for example, one that requires one neighbour to play 
daily serenades at one’s neighbour balcony – will result in negotiations over the 
removal of the promise in the case of a change of ownership. 
 
* * * 
 
Of course, touch and concern provides merely a necessary, but not  
sufficient, condition for the “real” nature of the right. Although it is more likely 
that the costs (p C(ATC)) involved in having idiosyncratic promises run with the 
land will be higher than that of impersonal promises, which have a stronger 
chance of standing the test of time, it might be that certain kinds of promises, 
which are classified as real or predial, might not pass the test. In other words, the 
requirement of touch and concern provides only a prima facie case for the 
prevention of deadweight losses; i.e. it avoids the cost benefit analysis of the 
formula above when there is no connection with land.81 So, in light of the 
objective of minimization fragmentation losses, the test is incomplete.  
                                                                 
81 The non-predial (personal) nature of the right obviously does not exclude that 
occasionally such an arrangement satisfies an anticommons integrated cost benefit 
analysis. Two reasons, however, might explain why the prediality test has not been 
construed as a mere presumptive test but as a formal requirement of the "real" nature of the 
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 It must be noted also that the original definition of touch and concern, as 
it was developed in English decisions at the start of the 19th century, is highly 
restrictive and inflexible. It originates from a time where the burden of a 
covenantor, which requires the covenantor to do an affirmative act, even on his 
own land, did not run with his land.82 
 
Since the courts reorientated towards a more ‘substance’ based 
approach of touch and concern they have at the same time struggled to formulate 
an accurate definition of touch and concern.83 The fact that today’s economy is 
more dynamic that in the 19th century might provide an explanation for the 
development of the more lenient, ex-post, substantive evaluations of land use 




2. The Ex Post Approach of the New Restatement 
 
 Historically, common law courts have started to apply doctrines of 
‘changed circumstances’ and ‘relative hardship’ to refuse enforcement of 
covenants that have lost their original purpose and value, without having to obtain 
the unanimous consent of the various right holders;84 or in cases where 
                                                                                                                                                             
right: (1) The administrative cost and uncertainty that would be generated by courts 
getting involved in the formidable weighing of costs and benefits when determining the 
nature of the right; (2) Notice to third party purchasers that need to rely on the public 
record without much opportunity for an ad hoc cost benefit analysis in each situation. 
82 See Neponsit, citing  Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114, L.R.A. 1918E, 222, 
Ann.Cas. 1915B, 872.) As the economy changed in ever new directions, it was felt as an 
artificial limitation to uphold these stringent criteria from previous era. And since the 
historic distinction between affirmative and negative covenants has gradually been 
abandoned by American courts, the older definition of touch and concern was relinquished 
in favor of an intent and substance directed approach, instead of the older, formal  locus. 
83 See supra note 26. 
84 Note that the doctrine of changed circumstances applies only when changed conditions 
have aversely affected the benefited lot, the focus is not on the burdened lot. Relative 
hardship involves a relative cost/benefit analysis across both the burdened and benefited 





enforcement will result in hardship to the owner of the burdened land, in 
disproportion to the benefit obtained from the enforcement, courts may decline 
servitude enforcement.85 A subdivision restriction, for example, might require the 
use of outmoded architectural details or the use of outdated and inefficient 
building materials. When contractual annulments of such subdivision covenant 
proves difficult because of holdout problems between the various property-
holder’s rights courts can turn to these doctrines to annul the covenant. 
 
 Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to intervene with real covenants, 
even  when changes in the surrounding environment (e.g., gradual transformation 
of a residential subdivision into a commercial or industrial area) had come to 
defeat the original purpose and value of the covenant for the parties. In recent 
years however, common law jurisdictions have increasingly held that the doctrine 
of changed circumstances is a defense to a claim for damages and may be used 
to terminate a real covenant.86 If a sufficient number of covenant restrictions have 
been violated, courts tend to consider the general subdivision plan abandoned.87  
                                                                                                                                                             
lot - both are intertwined since changed circumstances are crucial to a finding of relative 
hardship, see Rabin, supra  note 7, 541-42, citing Korngold, Gerald. (1990), PRIVATE LAND 
USE ARRANGEMENTS, New York, McGraw-Hill, 400 (Sec. 11.07). These theories are a result 
of the contract law origin of covenants. For examples see Eagle Enterprises, Inc. v. Gross, 
39 N.Y.2d 505, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717, 349 N.E.2d 816 (1976); Landau v. City of Leawood, 519 
P.2d 676 (Kan.1974). 
85 This resembles a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test. See N. Kaldor, Welfare Propositions and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 542-549 (1939); J.R. Hicks 
(1939), The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 696-710. “At the 
heart of this criterion is the idea that if the maximum amount of winners (those who benefit 
from a proposed change) are willing to pay for a change is greater than the minimum 
amount losers (those who are adversely affected by the change) are prepared to accept in 
compensation, then the change should go ahead, regardless of whether compensation is 
paid.” Cam Donaldson, Cam and Robert J. Oxoby, Kaldor, Hicks, and Reference 
Dependency: Developing a New Willingness to Pay Method from Old Principles, 
UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS,  Discussion Paper 2002-01, p. 2 
(2002). 
86 Hess v. Country Club Park, 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931); Restatement of Property § 
564. For a more extensive discussion, see Dwyer, John P. and Peter S. Menell (1998), 
Property Law and Policy: A Comparative Institutional Perspective, Westbury, New York, 
Foundation Press, 1076p.; Stoebuck, William B. (1977), ‘Running Covenants: An Analytical 
Primer’, 52 Washington Law Review 861, 882-85. In their recommendation for a unified 
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Perhaps the move the increased reliance on changed circumstances  
presents a case for suggesting that “real” but non intrinsic (idiosyncratic) rights 
should instead be subjected to a rule of liberative prescription in order to 
bypass/avoid the fragmentation problems and losses associated with the 
perpetuity of those rights, even if not actively enjoyed. 
 
 In a similar vein, Rose and others have suggested that servitudes should 
be limited to some fixed period.88 It is hard to think of servitudes that can be 
expected to last forever.89 Arguing that servitudes should be geared to the 
‘expected life of the development they serve,’ parties should therefore state a 
                                                                                                                                                             
concept of servitudes French and Reichman propose to have the touch and concern 
principle replaced by a ‘usefulness’ doctrine, supplemented with a ‘changed 
circumstances’ device. See French, supra  note 6; Reichman I, supra  note 6. The latter 
would serve the purpose to do away with servitudes that have become obsolete and more 
importantly to counteract ‘hold-out’ situations (in a pursuit of economic efficiency). Carol 
Rose objects to this proposal for several reasons. She remarks that a ‘usefulness’ concept 
within a relaxed doctrine of ‘changed circumstances,’ as suggested by French and 
Reichman, introduces another element of uncertainty into the law of servitudes. The 
prospect of the imposition of future present-day conceptions of obsolescence to their 
servitudes might discourage parties from land development. See Rose, Carol M. (1982), 
‘Servitudes, Security and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and Reichman’, 
55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1403-1417. See also Robinson, Glen O. (1991), ‘Explaining Contingent 
Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete Covenants”’, 91 Columbia Law Review 546 (a doctrine of 
changed circumstances undermines personal commitments and stable expectations). The 
application of changed circumstances to easements, as proposed by the Third Restatement 
met great opposition from a group of leading scholars, see Daily Developments 9/20/96, ‘Is 
the Restatement Killing Easements?’, <<http://www.umkc.edu/dirt/1996.htm>> (Last visited 
November 2002). 
87 Article 783 of the La. Civil Code holds that incertitude “as to the existence, validity, or 
extent of building restrictions is resolved in favor of the unrestricted use of the 
immovable.” When there is doubt as to the content or validity of a restriction (e.g., a 
question on the validity of a subdivision plan or real covenant), the doubt is resolved 
favoring the unrestricted use of property - a principle of favorem libertatis.  See Parisi, 
Entropy, 615. 
88 See Rose, supra  note 85, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE (1964); Ellickson, supra  note 73 (1973). 
89 Rose cites servitudes that assure protection of natural and historic heritage, for instance 
preservation easements.  See Rose, supra  note 85.  





limited length of time that they think the servitude will enhance the development, 
beyond that point the servitude would be open for renegotiation. Rose’s 
approach to limitation of servitudes of a fixed duration, chosen by the parties at 
the outset and renegotiated periodically,90 closely resembles that of the 
contractual model.91 
 
Previously, findings of “changed circumstances” or “relative hardship” were to be 
masked under the touch and concern demand, requiring unqualified invalidation 
of the covenant. In a new addition to the Third Restatement, the American Law 
Institute has substantially increased the possibilities for modification and 
termination of servitudes. The Restatement takes the position that servitudes may 
be freely created and transferred because, under its new provisions, the problem 
of obsoleteness and inalienability can be addressed more directly through 
termination principles.  
 
 The replacement of touch and concern by a requirement of illegality, 
unconstitutionality and violation of public policy has shifted the enquiry of 
servitude validity. Whereas under the test of touch and concern for the 
enforcement of the servitude it had to be establish that the promise touched and 
concerned the land, under the new rule, those avoiding the enforcement of the 
servitude must establish that the arrangement is illegal, unconstitutional or in 
violation of public policy.  
 
The Third Restatement emphasis on the accessibility of modification and 
termination of servitude arrangements is reflected first and foremost in Section 
7.12 which provides special rules for the modification and termination of 
affirmative covenants. Section 7.12.(1) provides Courts with the option of 
termination or modification of covenants that require payments for services to the 
burdened estate, if the obligation becomes excessive in relation to the cost of 
                                                                 
90  See Rose, supra  note 85. Similarly, Ellickson suggests standard termination procedures 
and maximum life spans for covenants. See Ellickson, supra  note 73. 
91 See infra Section V. 
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providing the services or to the value received by the burdened estate.92 Section 
7.13, which provides for the modification and termination of servitudes where it 
is difficult to locate beneficiaries, makes it difficult or possible to rid the land of 
obsolete or inconvenient servitudes.93 Similarly, Section 7.14 provides the 
extinguishment of servitude benefits that remain unrecorded , save for certain 
exceptions, by applicable recording act. These adaptations are sensible in a 




B. Civil Law: Liberative Numerus Clausus and Obsolete Covenants  
 
 
1. Liberative Numerus Clausus 
 
 As discussed above, modern legal systems around the world have in 
different ways manifested a general reluctance to recognize atypical property 
agreements as enforceable real rights.94 In recent decades, however, courts and 
                                                                 
92 The main concern seems to lie with perpetual covenants to pay for benefits in the past 
and covenants that require payment for services and facilities if payment is required 
without regard to use of the services or facilities, or if the service provider enjoys a 
monopoly position in relation to the burdened property owner. See RESTATEMENT , 
comment to 7.12. In addition, the RESTATEMENT  requires that any modifications, in relation 
to the decrease in value to the burdened estate, should take into account any investment 
made by the covenantee in reasonable reliance on continued validity of the covenant 
obligation - unless the servient owner is only required to renumerate services actually used 
and if alternative sources of supply are available, see 7.12 (2)). Note that 7.12 does not 
apply to obligations to a community association covered under Chapter 6 or to reciprocal 
obligations imposed pursuant to a common plan of development. 
93To prevent an eroding effect on the security of property rights, Section 7.13 of the 
(THIRD) RESTATEMENT also provides that land owners may notify the holder of the servient 
estate or by recording notice of their interests to prevent the workings of 7.13. 
94 See, supra  Section I. Recently, common law courts have been relatively creative in 
figuring out ways to enforce contracts that create covenants designed to protect existing 
amenities in residential areas. Furthermore, legal systems occasionally will invent a new 
form of property. Despite these periodical innovations, this area of the law remains the 
most archaic. Rose, supra  note 85, at  213-214, observes that the common law system of 





legislatures in both civil and common law jurisdictions, attuned to the modern 
needs of land developers and property owners, have recognized new property 
arrangements.95 The clearest example of this gradual expansion of standard 
property arrangements in civil law jurisdictions can be found in the creation of 
new sui generis real rights that run with the land.96 
 
In order to protect these newly recognized real rights, courts have 
developed an elaborate set of requirements to minimize the long-term effects of 
the non-conforming fragmentation of property, adopting a set of rules that differ 
from traditional property or contract law. Legal systems instead balance the need 
to mitigate fragmentation in property by creating perpetual restrictions on the use 
and alienability of property with the demands of landowners and property 
developers, wishing to exercise their contractual freedom to dispose of their 
property as they deem appropriate. Various legal traditions have employed 
different instruments to achieve this goal. For example, under modern French 
law, courts do not recognize atypical property covenants as sources of real 
rights, though they allow parties to approximate a real right by drawing on the 
notion of transferable obligations. Thus, French cases have construed contracts 
                                                                                                                                                             
estates in land now seem almost crude and antiquated. As the author ironically points out, 
references to the “fee tail” seldom fail to bring a smile. CAROL M. ROSE, WHAT GOVERNMENT 
CAN DO FOR PROPERTY (AND VICE VERSA), in THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209-222 (Nicholas Mercuro et al. 1999). 
95 YIANNOPOULOS notes the inadequacy of building and zoning ordinances to satisfy the 
needs of local property owners (e.g., for the preservation of the subdivision style, etc.). He 
also mentions that land developers have, since the turn of the 20th century, imposed 
contractual restrictions limiting the use of property to enhance property values (e.g. 
restricting use to certain specified purposes, prohibiting the erection of certain types of 
buildings, or specifying the material or the colors that may be used in the construction). 
A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY COURSEBOOK: LOUISIANA LEGISLATION, 
JURISPRUDENCE, AND DOCTRINE (3rd ed. 1983).  Rudden, supra note 40, observes, along 
similar lines, that although standard possessory interests involve exclusive and continuous 
possession, individuals may seek to acquire alternate interests such as a time-share, which 
is exclusive possession for repeated, short intervals. He thinks that servitude interests 
have seen the most innovation of late, and that security interests have seen the least 
innovation.  
96 This is analogous to the t rend of the valediction of  new (positive) easements witnessed 
under common law, see McCarthy supra  note 36, at pages 6-8. 
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between property owners as sources of obligations that are effective against third 
persons.97 In Germany and Greece, atypical property covenants are also not 
enforced as real rights, but, as Yiannopoulos98 points out, by allowing the 
contractual remedies to extend beyond the original parties to the covenant 
produces similar effects. 
 
 Courts have also begun to circumvent the numerus clausus rule and 
recognize servitudes that benefit the holder in their personal capacity. For 
instance, after some hesitation the courts, both in France and Belgium, 
recognized that agreements prohibiting land from being used for industrial 
purposes or limiting its use to residences only are servitudes not to build 
(servitudines non aedificandi).99 Also, they have given a broad interpretation to 
the exception for affirmative covenants accessory to an otherwise valid 
servitude.100 For instance, an obligation to maintain a garden enclosed with a 
fence in front of the house was held accessory to an agreement not to construct 
anything else in front of the yard.101 As McCarthy notes, such a process may be 
regarded as the equivalent in the American system of enlarging the common law 




                                                                 
97 YIANNOPOULOS,  supra  note 86, observes that the French Supreme Court (e.g., Civ., Dec. 
12, 1899, D. 1900.1.361, with a note by Gény) recognized the effect against third parties of a 
property covenant by relieving the operator of a mine from liability for damage to the 
surface. See also  JEAN-LOUISBERGEL, LES SERVITUDES DE LOTISSEMENT A  USAGE 
D’HABITATION (1973). 
98 YIANNOPOULOS, supra  note 86. 
99 McCarthy, supra  note, citing Wesemael v. De Jonge [1933] Pas. Belge II 189 (Cour 
d’appel, Bruxelles) and Dumouchel v. Catelain et Legrand [1900] Recueil des Arrets des 
Cours d’appel de Caen et Rouen 176 (Cour d’appel, Caen). 
100 See, PLANIOL,  MARCEL. AND RIPERT ,  GEORGE,  TRAITE PARTIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL 
FRANÇAIS 919 (2nd ed. 1952). ___ 
101 Lebbe v. Pelseneer [1965] J. Trib. 87 (Cour d’appel, Bruxelles 1964). 
102 McCarthy, supra  note 36, at page 6. 





2. Obsolete Covenants 
 
 The civil law approach to servitudes now integrates a number of 
provisions as to the automatic extinction of servitudes. The French code, for 
instance, provides that a servitude will be extinguished when the land is in such as 
state that use cannot be made of them,103 non-use by the owner during 30 
years,104 and when the owner of dominant estate and owner of the servient estate 
become one and the same.105 More recently, these provisions have been 
amended with an additional provision that allows judges to terminate the 
servitude when it has lost all utility to the dominant estate.106 The court may thus 
unravel situations of unproductive use by dissolving servitudes that encumber the 
servient estate when, at the same time, the servitude has lost all utility to the 




IV. EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST APPROACHES:  
THE ECONOMIC RELATIVITY OF PROPERTY 
 
The comparative analysis of the requirement of “touch and concern” and 
other similar restrictions in the law of servitudes reveals a gradual shift from an ex 
ante approach, exemplified by the enumerated rights approach of the early 
Civilian tradition, to an ex post approach, found in the “changed circumstances” 
doctrine of the new Restatement of Property or the emerging Civilian tests for 
non-conforming property arrangements. 
 
Both attitudes reveal a full attention to the problems of property 
fragmentation, but address the same issue from different ends.    
    
                                                                 
103 Impossibility of use, see Article 703 C.C. 
104 Prescription of extinction of 30 years, Article 706 C.C. 
105Confusion, Article 705 C.C.. See generally, ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ, Droit Civil IV, 829-834 
(1951). 
106See, for example, Article 710bis of the Belgian Civil Code, 5:78a. Dutch Civil Code. 
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The early civilian approach addresses the problem more rigidly, with a 
preventive attitude. The numerus clausus doctrine, for example, prevents the 
creation of atypical property arrangements and the consolidation of non-
conforming agreements into perpetual property rights, by denying recognition and 
remedial protection to such arrangements.107 
  
Departing from such traditional attitude, however, the emerging 
approaches – best exemplified by the gradual abandonment of the “touch and 
concern” requirements at Common law, in favor of the more flexible “changed 
circumstances” doctrine – are, instead, remedial rather than preventive in nature. 
This allows the creation of atypical and non-conforming rights, outside the 
enumerated listing of traditional property law, but creates default mechanisms to 
facilitate the reunification of fragmented property, for those arrangements that, 
due to a change of circumstances, have lost their usefulness over time. This 
approach is remedial in the sense that it corrects ex post those situations of 
property fragmentation that are unlikely to be voluntarily corrected by the 
interested parties. 
 
In light of such paradigmatic shift in the law of servitudes, one should 
naturally look for a plausible explanation. What has driven the gradual 
abandonment of the preventive ex ante approach in favor of the corrective ex 
post approach? For legal scholars, the temptation is great to provide the 
explanation often provided by comparative legal theorists: the shift is due to the 
gradual corrosion of traditional legal dogmas and the gradual increase in judicial 
pragmatism in adopting new solutions for the problem of property fragmentation. 
We shall resist such temptation and offer an alternative hypothesis: the “touch 
and concern” and prediality requirements for servitudes, and the enumerated 
approach to real rights in general, was formulated for the standard needs of rural 
                                                                 
107 This more drastic approach to the prevention of property fragmentation should not be 
surprising. The civil law is in fact well-known for pushing the theory of absolute ownership 
(dominium) quite far, so far that many believe that this is the reason that the civil law never 
developed the law of trust. See, e.g. Vera Bolgar, Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 204 (1953); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The 
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. LAW 
REVIEW 434 (1998). 





and urban societies, and no longer fits the profile of the modern economy and 
changing needs of the modern land economy.  
 
 The usefulness of the numerus clausus doctrine, with the enumeration of 
recognized property forms, is indeed highly dependent on the needs of society 
and the structure of the economy. Evidence of the relativity of the categories of 
real property can be found already in Roman law, at the very outset of the 
conception of typical real rights. Roman law developed a different listing of the 
recognized forms of property in rural and urban societies, given the different 
likely needs of real property owners in the two social settings. Property 
servitudes that were serving a valuable and durable purpose in an urban setting 
(e.g., light easements, etc.) were not likely to have a similar long-lasting value in 
an agricultural and rural setting, and vice versa. As a result, servitudes that could 
validly be constituted on an urban property would not necessarily be recognized 
if imposed on agricultural land, and vice versa. In such setting, the validity and 
admissibility of the constituted servitude depended on the social and economic 
context in which it was operating. While the “touch and concern” requirement 
has been sufficiently flexible to be adapted to changing circumstances overtime, 
its limitations as an absolute limit to the creation of new forms of property has 
proved to be increasingly binding in the new economy.  
 
It is not surprising, then, to see that the rigid approach of the numerus 
clausus doctrine, and to the specific restrictions to the creation of various 
nominate real rights has become increasingly tight and unfitting the changing 
needs of the modern world. In the modern world economy, the diverse needs of 
local communities and the special needs of a fast-changing industrial and digital 
economy pose ever changing challenges to traditional property dogmas and to 
the enumerated categories of property law, such as to render the rigid ex ante 
test of conformity obsolete and hardly useful. In such a changing and volatile 
environment, the gradual shift to a more flexible corrective approach is thus 
explainable as a way to accommodate new property needs, while minimizing the 
risk of persisting property fragmentation.  
 
Likewise, other legal rules may create default reunification mechanisms. 
Time limits, statutes of limitation, liberative prescription, rules of extinction for 
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non-use, etc., can all be regarded as legal devices that facilitate the otherwise 
costly and difficult reunification of non-conforming fragments of a property right.  
 
These legal solutions are analogous to a gravitational force, reunifying 
rights that, given their strict complementarity, would naturally be held by a single 
owner. This tendency towards reunification works to rebundle property rights in 
order to regenerate the natural conformity between use and exclusion rights and 




V. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT: PROBLEM OR SOLUTION? 
 
This Article suggests that there is a reason for imposing restrictions in the 
creation of atypical real rights. Such reason relates to the problems of 
anticommons that has recently been identified in the law and economics literature. 
To clarify the ideological underpinnings of our analysis, we have been stressing 
that excessive fragmentation is not the result of irrational or short-sighted choices 
of private parties. To the contrary, excessive equilibrium levels of property 
fragmentation may obtain even with fully rational individual choices made in a 
world of stochastic uncertainty.  
 
In this context, this Article examined the alternative solutions of damage-
type remedies or inalienability rules (e.g., numerus clausus doctrines) and other 
restrictions in the field of property law and concluded that most such solutions 
can be explained not on the basis of distrust for private autonomy, but on the 
basis of a realization of the asymmetric forces that can possibly lead towards 
increasing anticommons fragmentation.  
 
The preceding analysis should, however, be qualified by an important 
corollary. If parties’ autonomy were extended to the choice of remedy, by 
allowing the parties to choose the form of remedial protection at the moment of 
creating, transferring, or modifying a property right, the problem would in most 
instances disappear. If the freedom of contract of the parties could extend not 
only to the content of the property agreement, but also to the ability of the parties 





to specify how their newly created property interest should be protected, rational 
actors would logically limit the adoption of real-type remedial protection to those 
instances in which the expected benefits of such “hard” protection would likely 
justify the costs of anticommons fragmentation in the future. Alternatively, they 
could still pursue their short term objective by creating property arrangements 
with “soft” protection, thus avoiding the expected costs of perpetual 
fragmentation. 108 
 
 In this context, it should be noted that much of the reason for the recent 
“real covenant” movement was driven by the legal inability of parties to create 
property arrangements that were at the same time “soft” in the remedial 
protection and opposable to third party purchasers as real rights. Absent such 
private autonomy in the choice of remedial protection, the parties would be 
facing a double-edged sword. If structured as contractual obligations, the 
covenants would have the benefit of a “soft” type protection but would not enjoy 
the opposability and durability of real-type arrangements. Alternatively, if 
structured as real rights, the real covenants would enjoy the benefits of a full-
fledged property interest (including recordability and opposability to subsequent 
owners), but would consequently generate the costs of a “hard” type protection 
(including the problems of entropy and persisting fragmentation). Rational owners 
will choose the lesser of the two evils, but would not be able to combine the best 
attributes of each alternative solution by custom-tailoring the structure and 
remedial protection of their property interest.109 
 
It is thus important to conclude by noting that anticommons problems 
could be avoided either by (a) imposing restrictions on the parties' autonomy 
(e.g., numerus clausus) and adopting conservative remedial protection, or, with 
a methodologically opposite approach, (b) expanding the domain of individual 
autonomy and letting parties freely specify the type of remedial protection at the 
moment of creating, transferring or modifying a property interest. Anticommons 
                                                                 
108 Francesco Parisi, Freedom of Contract and the Laws of Entropy, 10 SUPREME COURT 
ECON. REV. 65-90 (2002). 
109 Francesco Parisi, The Asymmetric Coase Theorem: Dual Remedies for Unified Property, 
GEORGE MASON LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER, No. 01-13, 15-18 (2002).  
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problems can thus be conceived as resulting from too much freedom of contract 
or, conversely, as the result of too little contractual freedom in the structuring of 






From the limitations of the old institutions of contract law, courts 
gradually created a new body of law which allowed land use-related promises to 
attach to the title to property. At the same time, almost without exception, legal 
systems implementing the innovation of running promissory servitudes, have 
created atypical regimes to govern remedial protection and regulate these new 
rights.  These are rules that diverge substantially from the traditional principles 
governing property or contracts. Commentators generally attribute these 
divergences to mere historical accidents. Contrary to the common wisdom in the 
literature, this Article explains why these anomalies might not be haphazard after 
all.  
 
As we have argued, benchmark doctrines such as ‘touch and concern’ 
and the civil law principles of ‘prediality’ and numerus clausus have served as 
instruments to limit cases of dysfunctional fragmentation. The treatment of certain 
land-related promises as enforceable contracts between parties rather than real 
rights that run with the land in perpetuity, can be explained as an attempt to 
minimize the transaction and strategic costs resulting from dysfunctional property 
arrangements. Likewise, as we discussed in Section III, legal rules create default 
reunification mechanisms. In property law time limits, statutes of limitation, 
liberative prescription, rules of extinction for non-use, etc., can all be regarded as 
legal devices to facilitate the, otherwise costly and difficult, reunification of non-
conforming fragments of a property right. 
 
                                                                 
110  Francesco Parisi, Freedom of Contract and the Laws of Entropy, 10 SUPREME COURT 
ECON. REV. 65-90 (2002). 





Furthermore, a comparative analysis of the common law requirement of 
“touch and concern” and other similar restrictions in the civilian law of servitudes 
reveals a paradigmatic shift in the law of servitudes from an ex ante approach of 
preventing the creation of atypical property arrangements, best exemplified by 
the enumerated rights approach of the early Civilian tradition, to an ex post 
approach of remedial protection from such arrangements, such as is found in the 
recent emphasis on a ‘changed circumstances’ doctrine in common law and 
civilian systems and the abandonment of the requirement of touch and concern in 
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